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I. INTRODUCTION
The most compact form of wealth known to man lies tucked away in
various corners of Africa. Diamonds, despite their beauty, have been
complicit in some of the greatest human tragedies of this century. Mined
* J.D. expected May 2006. I would like to thank the members and editorial board
of the San Diego International Law Journal for all of their advice and hard work.
Additionally, I would like to express my deepest appreciation for my friends and family,
especially my parents, Ellis and Elizabeth Fluet.
in conflict areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra
Leone, and Angola, the mining and sale of "conflict diamonds" have
provided significant funds to a number of murderous organizations,
including the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and Al
Quaeda in Afghanistan. As diamonds flow out of African war zones
into Western markets, weapons and cash flow in, displacing millions of
individuals and killing thousands of others. The migration of these gems,
from alluvial field to engagement ring, follows a crooked route that
leaves displacement, destruction and death in its wake.
The movement of these illicit gems and the disastrous wake it leaves
behind has only recently begun to receive the worldwide attention it
deserves. However, little is being done to effectively stem the tide of
these conflict diamonds. International efforts have proven ineffective due
to limited oversight and ineffective international trade regulations. The
United States, as the largest consumer of diamonds in the world and the
leader in the fight against terrorism, has a distinct responsibility for
heading international efforts to curb the market in conflict diamonds.
Surprisingly, despite this unique position, the United States has failed to
take adequate steps to halt the conflict diamond trade.
In the wake of September 11 and revelations that Al Qaeda laundered
money through conflict diamonds, the United States passed the Clean
Diamond Trade Act (CTDA) in order to stop the movement of conflict
diamonds. However, this legislation, bereft of strong oversight and
significant penalties for offenders, will not deter foreign nations and
corporations from continuing to deal in conflict diamonds. The United
States, due to its unique position in the diamond pipeline, must enact
compelling legislation that will encourage both foreign countries and
corporations to cease dealing in conflict diamonds.
This article will examine U.S. and international efforts to combat the
trade in conflict diamonds. Specifically, this article will detail their failures
and examine the need for U.S. backed legislation to prevent the conflict
diamond trade more effectively. This article proceeds as follows: Part I
will examine the effect of the conflict diamond trade on those caught in
the grip of civil war and terrorism.' Part II will analyze international efforts
to curtail conflict diamonds trade, specifically examining international
support of the Kimberley Process.2 Part III and IW will examine the United
States' efforts to regulate conflict diamonds and the inherent flaws in the
CTDA.3 Part V will suggest a proposal for more appropriate U.S.
1. See infra Part I (discussing how the trade in conflict diamonds affects
international human rights and national security).
2. See infra Part II (discussing the relevant U.N. actions taken to curb the illicit
diamond trade and the resulting provisions of the Kimberley Process).
3. See infra Part III and Part IV (discussing the development of the Clean
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legislation.4 In conclusion, this article will assert that the migration of
conflict diamonds out of Africa and into Western markets has buttressed
the tragic movement of weapons and cash into the hands of dangerous
rebel armies and terrorist organizations. Without strong support from
the United States, the conflict diamond trade will continue to fund rebel
groups and terrorist organizations.
II. THE EFFECT OF DIAMOND MIGRATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
A. Conflict Diamonds and Human Rights
Internationally, the movement of conflict diamonds has created some
of the most serious human rights issues of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. Conflict diamonds are "[d]iamonds that originate from areas under
the control of forces that are in opposition to elected and internationally
recognized governments, or are in any way connected to those groups." 5
Before the end of the Cold War, rebel armies in parts of Africa relied on
funds from various Cold War players such as the U.S.S.R., Cuba, China
and the United States.6 After the fall of the Berlin Wall, rebels fighting in
Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC emerged without adequate
funds to maintain militaries or political regimes.7 These rebel groups
then turned to commodities such as diamonds that were accessible and
had an ample international market.8 The trade in diamonds was successful
for the rebels: in Angola, for example, the rebel group UNITA amassed
$3.7 billion through its control of conflict diamonds in the 1990s, a sum
Diamond Trade Act and relevant provisions).
4. See infra Part V (proposing new legislation based on legislation such as the
Helms-Burton Act).
5. GLOBAL WIrNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: POssmILrTEs FOR THE IDENTIFICATION,
CERTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF DIAMONDS, at 1 (May 2000), available at http://www.
globalwitness.org/reports [hereinafter GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS].
6. See GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS 98 (2002).
7. GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Due to this funding [UNITA was] able to maintain a sophisticated military
operation which effectively ensured that no peace process in Angola would
work. In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front was transformed into a
well-equipped and lethal fighting force due to the control and sale of high-
value gem diamonds.
Id.
that far exceeds the amount given to UNITA by its partners during the
entire Cold War period.9
Although exceedingly successful for rebel groups, the trade in conflict
diamonds invigorated civil wars that proved disastrous for innocent
civilians. In 1996 alone, fourteen African countries were engulfed in conflict,
"accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and
resulting in more than eight million refugees, returnees and displaced
persons."'10 Human rights abuses in Sierra Leone have been exceptionally
devastating. Fueled by the trade in conflict diamonds, Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) rebels targeted civilians and children, burning them
alive or amputating their limbs" and recruited thousands of child soldiers
to commit further atrocities against their fellow countrymen. 12 The RUF's
diamond war led to the deaths of approximately 75,000 people and
mutilated another 20,000.13 The RUF's brutal tactics served the military
objective of inducing "tectonic population shifts away from the diamond
areas."' 14 During this conflict, combat displaced 30% of the country's
4.6 million people. 15
Diamond sales funded the ammunition and weapons used in these
conflicts, which, in Sierra Leone, gave the RUF millions of dollars ayear.16 As diamonds flowed out of areas like Sierra Leone, weapons
flowed in from sympathetic governments or weapon smugglers. 17 The
trade of diamonds for weapons has resulted in six million war-related
9. Id.
10. Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in
Africa, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315, 315 (2003).
11. Margo Kaplan, Note, Carats and Sticks: Pursuing War and Peace Through the
Diamond Trade, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 559, 571 (2003); see also Jim Hoagland,
The Trouble With Africa Is .. .; The Developed World Has Long Abandoned Africa to a
Fate Outside the New Global Era, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 2000, at N27. Describing an
RUF leader,
Sierra Leone has become the world's heart of horror, put on the news map by
Mr. Sankoh's use of amputations, gang rape and forcing children to massacre
their own families. Not even the Nazis refined mass terror tactics so thoroughly
and indiscriminately as has this disgruntled ex-corporal.
Id.
12. See Kaplan, supra note 11, at 571.
13. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 31.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 571 (citing Conflict Diamonds: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 48 (2001)); see
also Paula R. Newberg, Chaos Fills a State the West Ignores: Sierra Leone, L.A. TIMES,
May 14, 2000, at M2.
16. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 81.
17. Id. at63.
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fatalities in Africa over the last fifty years, mostly by small arms and
light weapons.18
Although Angola and Sierra Leone have signed peace accords, the
trade of diamonds by the RUF and UNITA continues to threaten the
security of both countries.1 9 Moreover, there is concern that neither of
the newly formed governments will be able to control its respective
nation's resources responsibly.
20
In Sierra Leone, diamonds were not the sole cause of the civil war.
The government's corrupt use of the diamond mines and its inability to
control its natural resources also contributed to the outbreak of civil
war.21 Another significant source of conflict diamonds, the DRC, remains
mired in a civil war that is "characterized by ongoing violence and
armed conflict, which has created a humanitarian disaster and contributed to
civilian deaths., 22 By some estimates, about $600 million in diamonds
are exported from the Congo on an annual basis.23 Less than a third are
exported legally.24 Therefore, as long as illegal diamonds and refugees
migrate out of these conflict zones, cash and weapons will continue to
migrate back in to further fuel conflict and instability.
B. Conflict Diamonds and National Security
The trade in conflict diamonds has devastated not only African
nations, but the global community as well. Strong evidence indicates that
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups use conflict diamonds for financing
and money laundering. To date, the terrorist network headed by
18. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333,
2338 (2003) (detailing the ease with which small arms can be traded for commodities
such as diamonds and the resulting destruction the illicit trade of weapons can have on
nations).
19. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 572-77.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 573.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Background Note: Democratic Republic of Congo, Jan.
2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm.
23. Douglas Farah, Digging Up Congo's Dirty Gems: Officials Say Diamond Trade
Funds Radical Islamic Groups, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at Al [hereinafter Farah,
Dirty Gems].
24. Id.
25. See GLOBAL WITNESS, FOR A FEW DOLLARS MORE: How AL QAEDA MOVED
INTO THE DIAMOND TRADE 13-15 (2003), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/
show.php/en.00041.html; see also Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at Al; see generally Trade in African Diamonds: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 2 (2001).
Osama bin Laden has gained millions of dollars from the sale of conflict
diamonds originating out of Sierra Leone.26 Following the bombings of
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in 1998,
the United States attempted to freeze Al Qaeda and Taliban bank
accounts. 7 Financially susceptible, Al Qaeda sought out more liquid
and fungible resources. 28
From 1998 to 2000, Al Qaeda aides met with RUF leaders in Sierra
Leone in order to purchase rebel-controlled diamonds.29  Al Qaeda
bought the gems in order to convert cash into a more liquid asset prior to
the September 11 attacks in the United States.30 Doing so allowed the
organization to hold several million dollars of assets in "the most
compact form of wealth known to man.,
31
Additionally, radical Islamic organizations have turned to Central
Africa in order to fund their movements. 32 Specifically, the Lebanon-
based movement, Hezbollah, has funneled millions of dollars through
the DRC to its organization.33 Hezbollah and other groups buy diamonds in
the DRC at a fraction of their value, smuggle them out of Africa and sell
them abroad for a sizable profit.34 Some of these diamonds are sold in
Antwerp, Belgium's diamond marketing hub, which has become the
financial headquarters for radical Islamic groups.35 U.S. officials, also
investigating terrorist links to the diamond trade, have focused on the
gold and uranium trade in areas like the DRC, where the borders are
almost completely uncontrolled.36 Therefore, to disrupt terrorist funds and
laundering activities, it is imperative to disconnect the conflict diamond
pipeline, which accounts for millions and perhaps tens of millions of
dollars in profits and money laundering.37
26. Farah, Dirty Gems, supra note 23, at Al.
27. Douglas Farah, African Nations Hosted Terror Chiefs, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 29,
2002, at A29; Michael Maggi, The Currency of Terrorism: An Alternative Way to
Combat Terrorism and End the Trade of Conflict Diamonds, 15 PACE INT'L L. REv. 513,
536 (2003).
28. Maggi, supra note 27, at 536.
29. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 186-88.
30. Id. at 187.
31. Id. at 188.
32. Farah, Dirty Gems, supra note 23, at A2.
33. Id. Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 bombings of U.S. marine barracks
and the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and for the kidnapping of Americans in Lebanon. See
generally Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God, (Feb. 2005),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateCO6.php?CID= 772.
34. Farah, Dirty Gems, supra note 23, at A2.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at A1-A2.
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Notably, the financing provided by diamonds sales also aids the
mobility of terrorists. 38 "Terrorist networks have been very creative in
their financial sources and in their infiltration into different areas where
fumding can be found., 39 Terrorist mobility depends on maintaining a
complex network of financial support and access to arms.40
The mobility of terrorists, their ability to cross borders, to acquire resources in
one state to use against another state, to find asylum in foreign sanctuaries, to
commit a crime in one state with weapons from another state against the citizen
of a third state and flee to yet a fourth state, has meant that a unilateral terrorist
policy is problematic. 4 1
Cutting off links to resources, such as diamonds, would prevent terrorist
networks from passing between borders.42 The regulation of such financial
markets is essential to curtail the migration of both diamonds and the
terrorists they fund.43 Interrupting this ability to relocate is as important
as reducing terrorist sources of funding.44 Therefore, inhibiting terrorist
funding, through sources like diamonds will not only decrease terrorist
organizations' ability to operate but will also hinder their ability to
migrate from country to country.
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO HALT THE CONFLICT
DIAMOND TRADE
A. The United Nations in Sierra Leone and Angola
In response to the serious human rights abuses occurring in Sierra
Leone and Angola, international organizations have taken the first steps
38. James J. Savage, Executive Use of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act-Evolution through the Terrorist and Taliban Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 28, 37, 41 (2001).
39. Id. at41.
40. Christopher J. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 230 (2002); see also Savage, supra note 38, at 37.
41. Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Comment Terrorism: A Global Phenomenon Mandating
a Unified International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 685, 712 (1999) (quoting
Martha Crenshaw, Unintended Consequences: How Democracies Respond to Terrorism,
21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153, 155 (1997)).
42. Savage, supra note 38, at 37 (discussing President Bush's use of the IEEPA to
restrict the financial resources of targeted terror organizations).
43. Id.
44. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Entry of
the 9/11 Hijackers Into the United States, Staff Statement No. 1, 10, http://news.fmdlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911 comm-ssl.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (on file with author).
towards halting the conflict diamond trade. The United Nations (U.N.)
first imposed sanctions and embargoes against Angola and Sierra Leone
in the 1990's. 45 In 1997, the United Nations imposed an arms embargo
on Sierra Leone and established UNAMSIL, a peacekeeping operation.
Despite the embargo, the RUF still managed to obtain weapons and
continue its trade in illicit diamonds.47 In fact, there have been suggestions
that some UNAMSIL forces may have cooperated with the RUF and
taken part in the plundering of diamonds. 48 By the year 2000, U.N. forces
pulled out of Sierra Leone due to constant attacks and kidnappings.' 9
The U.N. attempt to quell RUF forces has been described as "doomed
from the start." 50
Beyond military intervention, the United Nations also passed Security
Counsel Resolution 1306 (Resolution) on July 5, 2000.51 The Resolution
essentially made the purchase of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone
illegal and encouraged Sierra Leone's government to establish a
certification scheme for diamonds leaving its borders. Remarkably, the
Resolution called on diamond industry leaders and other representatives
in the diamond industry to assist the government in creating a well-
regulated diamond trade. 3
Similarly, the United Nations imposed sanctions against UNITA in
Angola. 4 These sanctions included the prohibition of arms sales and the
purchase of UNITA-mined diamonds, freezing UNITA finances and
restricting the travel of UNITA leaders.5 5 U.N. action, along with the death
of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, served to decrease the trade in conflict
diamonds. 6 However, only when these U.N. efforts were coupled with
45. United Nations, Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War (2001), http://www.
un.org/peace/africa /Diamond.html.
46. Ian Martinez, Conflict Resolution in Africa: Sierra Leone 's "Conflict Diamonds
The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws and Policy, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
217, 235 (2002).
47. Id. at 236.
48. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 92; see also New York Times News Service, Africa
Peace Unit Linked To Atrocities, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1999, at N-18 ("forces bombed
civilian targets, shot at 'human shields' formed by the rebels and mistreated the staffs of
the Red Cross and similar groups.").
49. See Martinez, supra note 46, at 237.
50. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 95 (quoting John Bolton's testimony before the
International Relations Committee, U.S. House of Rep., Oct. 11, 2001).
51. See S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000).
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Id. at 10-11; Laura Forest, Note, Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establishing
a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control over the Country's Diamond
Resources, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 633, 645 (2001).
54. Maggi, supra note 27, at 527.
55. Id. at 527-28.
56. Id. at 529.
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the movements of non-governmental organizations was a truly effective
multilateral effort established.
5 7
B. The Kimberley Process
In response to insufficient attempts by the United Nations to halt
the trade in conflict diamonds through sanctions and military efforts,
diamond-producing countries convened in May 2000 to establish
normative trade standards to prevent the conflict diamond trade. 58 In
December of the same year, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a
resolution supporting the formation of an international certification
scheme for rough diamonds.59 The aim of this international body60 was to
stem the tide of conflict diamonds while preserving markets for legitimate
rough diamonds.61 In 2002, after two years of negotiations, these
international efforts culminated in the creation of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS). The KPCS summarizes the provisions by
which, "the trade in rough diamonds is to be regulated by countries,
regional economic integration organizations and rough diamond-trading
,,62
entities.
Currently, the Kimberley Process consists of states and regional
economic integration organizations eligible to trade in rough diamonds
under the provisions of the KPCS.6 3 As of April 30, 2004, there were 43
"Participants," 64 representing all major rough diamond producing, exporting
and importing countries. 65 These Participants receive reports and
recommendations from the World Diamond Council (WDC)66 in order to
57. Id.
58. Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 34 (2003).
59. See Kimberley Process: Background, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/
?name=background (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Kimberley Process: Background].
60. This international body consisted of diamond industry insiders, NGOs and
governments. See id.
61. Kimberley Process: Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.Kimberleyprocess.
com:8080/site/?name=faq (last visited Nov. 6,2005) [hereinafter Kimberley Process, FAQs].
62. Kimberley Process, Background, supra note 59.
63. Kimberley Process, FAQs, supra note 61.
64. A "Participant' is defined as "a state or a regional economic integration organisation
for which the Certification Scheme is effective." Kimberley Process Certification Scheme,
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/ (click KPCS hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Kimberley Process Certification Scheme].
65. See Kimberley Process, FAQs, supra note 61.
66. See Trade in African Diamonds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 39 (2000). Statement of Matthew A. Runci,
develop a comprehensive method to stem the flow of conflict diamonds
while minimizing the impact on the legitimate trade.67
The fundamental aspects of the Kimberley Process are as follows:
1) each Participant must ensure that each export or import of rough
diamonds be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate and is
therefore tamper and forgery resistant; 2) each Participant must guarantee
that no shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a
non-participant; 3) each Participant is required to establish a system of
internal controls designed to remove conflict diamonds from shipments
coming in and out of its territory; 68 and 4) each Participant is required to
provide the others with information on their relevant laws, regulations,
rules, procedures and practices.69
Despite these attempts at control, the Kimberley Process may be too
vague in terms of internal controls to ensure that states effectively carry
out its agenda.70 The document does not specifically state what constitutes
an "appropriate" law or what action should be taken against transgressors.
71
Moreover, the "[Kimberley Process'] narrow definition of conflict
diamonds does not include polished stones and jewelry and could
exclude diamonds originating from recognized governments such as the
Democratic Republic of Congo. 72 It is this certification scheme that forms
the backbone of U.S. attempts to halt the trade in illicit diamonds.73
Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Jewelers of America, Inc. and spoke on
behalf of the World Diamond Council:
[t]he World Diamond Council (WDC) is the international body chartered in
Antwerp in July by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the
International Diamond Manufacturers Association, solely for the purpose of
rapidly developing and implementing a comprehensive plan to curtail trade in
conflict diamonds while minimizing impact on the legitimate diamond industry.
Membership of the Council is comprised of all segments of the international
diamond industry-producers, manufacturers, traders, and retailers-as well as




68. Such controls include the development of Importing and Exporting Authorities, the
use of tamper proof containers, the maintenance of dissuasive and proportional penalties
for transgressions, and a means for the collection of import and export data. Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme, supra note 64, at IV.
69. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 64, at V.
70. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 591.
71. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 64, at IV(d).
72. Amnesty International, Conflict Diamonds: Did Somebody Die for That Diamond?,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/diamonds/index.do (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
73. See infra Part IV.
[VOL. 7: 103, 2005] Conflict Diamonds
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
IV. U.S. EFFORTS TO HALT THE CONFLICT
DIAMOND TRADE
The United States is by far the most influential player in the global
diamond market.74 Accounting for over half of global diamond jewelry
retail sales, the United States is in a unique position to stem the migration
of conflict diamonds, and not only prevent human rights violations, but
also ensure its own national security.75 In 2000, over $800 million in rough
diamonds from fifty-three countries crossed U.S. borders.76 The diamond
jewelry market in the United States was valued at an estimated $26
billion in 2000.
77
The current Bush administration was initially resistant to the imposition
of trade sanctions involving the trade of conflict diamonds as a matter of
"ideological principle." 78 It was not until the September 11 attacks that the
White House began to seriously examine the issue of conflict diamonds.79
In April 2003, the United States Congress passed the Clean Diamond
Trade Act (CDTA or Act).80 Under the CDTA, rough diamonds may not
be imported into the United States unless they are controlled by the
Kimberley Process or are otherwise in accord with United Nations
Security Council resolutions. However, this requirement can be waived
in the event of a threat to national security.8 ' Under the CDTA, the
President shall prohibit the importation or exportation of rough diamonds
that have not been controlled by the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme. 82 Additionally, the CDTA permits the President to prohibit or
seize diamond and jewelry shipments if the traders violate or attempt to
74. GLOBAL WITNESS, BROKEN Vows: EXPOSING THE "LOUPE" HOLES IN THE
DIAMOND INDusTRY's EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE TRADE IN CONFLICT DIAMONDS, Mar.
2004 at 13, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00050.html
(hyperlink to PDF) [hereinafter GLOBAL WITNESS, BROKEN VOWS].
75. Id.
76. Price, supra note 58, at 42.
77. Id.
78. Daniel L. Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation,
and the Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 835, 844 (2003) (stating that the
administration opposed the Kimberley Process's goal of excluding the diamond trade
countries that refused to embrace its principles.). Moreover, the Bush administration, in
its initial refusal, was criticized for not wanting to place the safety and security of
African nations over the concerns of American business. See id at 864.
79. Id. at 853-54; see also Maggi, supra note 27, at 536-37.
80. Clean Diamond Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2004) [hereinafter CDTA].
81. Id; see also Rough Diamond Control Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,777 (Aug.
4, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 591 & 592).
82. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3903.
violate provisions of the CDTA.83 As enacted, the CDTA is a compromise
from the original Act, which required automatic sanctions against any
country that does not implement a system of controls.84
The Act's provisions are implemented by an inter-agency working
group coordinated by the Departments of State and Treasury.85 Violators
face civil and criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment of up
to ten years. 86 For exports of rough diamonds out of the United States,
the Kimberley Process Authority (KPA) was established.87 The KPA is
administered by officials from U.S. trade associations and is responsible
for issuing Kimberley Process certificates for all exports.88 However, it
is not clear how the U.S. government oversees and monitors the KPA.89
As noted by Global Witness, "there must be adequate U.S. government
oversight of the diamond trade in order for the system to be effective." 90
Participation in the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme (KPCS) is
required by the CDTA.91 The Kimberley Process Certificate certifies
that diamonds in a shipment are conflict-free. 92 The KPCS then leaves
each country to establish its own system of internal controls.9 3 It is vital
that countries maintain controls that track diamonds back from their
point of export to the location in which they were mined.94 The U.S.
government issues these certificates through the KPA. 95  However,
neither the KPA nor U.S. Customs examines the exports physically,
except on a random and infrequent basis. 96 Likewise, imports of rough
diamonds are rarely checked by U.S. Customs.
97
83. Id. § 3907.
84. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 607-08 (citing World Diamond Council, Changes
from HR 2722 to Compromise HR 2722, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/changes_
from hr 2722 to compromi.htm) (last visited Nov. 6, 2005); Simon Barber, US. Opposes
'Blood'Diamond Trade, Bus. DAY (S. Afr.), Nov. 29, 2001.
85. GLOBAL WITNESS, BROKEN Vows, supra note 74, at 14.
86. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3907; GLOBAL WITNESS, BROKEN VOWS, supra note
74, at 14.




91. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3903; See generally GLOBAL WITNESS: THE KEY TO
KIMBERLEY: INTERNAL DIAMOND CONTROLS-SEVEN CASE STUDIES, Oct. 2004 at 16,
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/index.phpsection=diamonds (hyperlink to
PDF) [hereinafter GLOBAL WITNESS, KEY].
92. GLOBAL WITNESS, KEY, supra note 91, at 1.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 17.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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V. FAILURE OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT
The Act's reliance on international delegations, the Kimberley Process
specifically, creates a serious detriment to U.S. efforts to stem the tide of
conflict diamonds. Despite the priority placed by the White House on
curtailing sources of funding for terrorist organizations, 98 and the
CDTA's stated intention to halt human rights abuses, the Act does not
realistically accomplish either goal. 99 The first and most glaring of the
CDTA's flaws, as discussed above,100 lies in the lack of supervision over
exports and imports of conflict diamonds. The infrequent examination
of diamond parcels increases the chances of diamond smuggling and
defeats the purpose of the CDTA.
The CDTA's reliance on international organizations, such as the
Kimberley Process, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the U.N.
Security Council, to carry out its mission is also problematic. The CDTA
mandates that shipments of rough diamonds be controlled through the
KPCS. 10' Additionally, the Act's effective date was predicated on
permission from the WTO or the U.N. Security Council. 10 2 This assimilation
of an international act proved controversial because it was claimed that
the CTDA "unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to international
bodies.' 0 3 Such assimilation directs the White House to adhere to
lawmaking by international institutions,' 4 in this case the Kimberley
Process. With the Act's passage, the United States delegated authority over
the trade in conflict diamonds to the Kimberley Process, WTO, and
Security Council, thus "converting a national principal into an institution's
agent."' 1 5 Therefore, the Act's dependence on others can be criticized as
an unconstitutional international delegation because of its reliance on
98. Farah, Dirty Gems, supra note 23, at Al.
99. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3901.
100. See supra Part III.
101. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3903.
102. 19 U.S.C.A. § 3901 (West 2005) (see note on the effective date of section).
103. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1492, 1519-20 (2004).
104. Id. at 1519. Other international assimilations include Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, which requires the President to inform Congress when a
nation adopts sanctions against Iran or Libya. See Swaine, supra note 103, at 1519 n.99.
Additionally, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(b), provides
that the President may conform to the Uruguay Round Agreements and enforce article
VII of the WTO Agreement once a sufficient number of nations accept the agreement.
Swaine, supra note 103, at 1519 n.100.
105. Swaine, supra note 103, at 1609.
international bodies for the execution of the law. 10 6 The United States,
rather than act as a leader in defeating the illegal diamond cartel, has
relegated itself to the position of an agent of the Kimberley Process.
Despite this reliance on international bodies, the Act provides the
President with a significant amount of discretion.10 7 In order to avoid the
appearance that the White House is capitulating to international bodies,
Section 15 of the Act states that the Act will take effect once the
President has certified that an applicable waiver granted from the WTO
or an applicable Security Council resolution is in effect.'0 8 Further, the
Act gives the President the discretion to decide how long the Act will
remain in effect.'0 9 Therefore, should the White House discover that the
diamond trade is not linked to terrorism, the discretion provided by the
CDTA permits the White House to abandon any further efforts to combat
the trade in conflict diamonds. 110 However, as some scholars, including
Edward Swaine note, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the President
cannot withdraw legislation based on an "independent exercise of policy
discretion.""' The CDTA imbues the President with discretion, which
makes the Act vulnerable not only to the potential imprudence of the
President but also to constitutional attacks. Therefore, the future of the
CDTA and its ability to stem the tide of conflict diamonds is seriously
called into question.
Although the international community has endorsed the Kimberley
Process broadly, some Participants believe that the scheme is not an adequate
tool for halting the trade in conflict diamonds." 2 The effectiveness of
the Kimberley Process, and therefore the CDTA, is entirely reliant on
the good faith of participating countries. Participants are only required
to enforce the minimum standards outlined by the Kimberley Process'
3
and receive broad discretion in implementing internal controls. "' With
this scheme, as long as an exporting country certifies that a shipment is
106. Id. at 1610.
107. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 609.
108. Swaine, supra note 103, at 1520 (citing Statement on Signing the Clean
Diamond Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 491 (Apr. 25, 2003)).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2003).
110. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 609.
111. Id. at 1610 (analyzing Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), where
the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutionally allowed
the President to cancel legislation based on executive discretion); see also Clinton v.
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998) (stating that "[i]f there is to be a new procedure in
which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may
"become a law," such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment
procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution.").
112. Price, supra note 58, at 4.
113. Id. at 36-37.
114. Id. at40.
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free of conflict diamonds, the importing country will not require any
further assurance.1 15 Therefore, the Act relies on the good faith of other
Participants, and not on enforcement for its effectiveness.
This good faith assumption on the part of the U.S. Congress is ill
placed considering the unpredictable internal diamond controls in many
diamond-producing countries. 116 In Angola, for example, there is no
guarantee that the nation's internal controls prevent diamonds from
being imported or exported illegally. 17 There is no system in place for
determining the origin of gems coming from diamond fields, beyond an
incomplete paper-based system." 8 Similarly, in the Democratic Republic
of Congo," 9 the controls established by the government provide little
data regarding the origin of diamonds entering the chain of trade, or
"even, potentially, whether they were mined in the DRC."' 2 ° In light of
these reports, "the danger is that self-regulation only amounts to a
statement on an invoice that is not verifiable" and is not supported by
any policies that prevent the purchase of conflict diamonds.' 21 Global
Witness cites the lack of a systematic, impartial review of Participants'
internal controls as one the chief flaws of the Kimberley Process. 122 Due
to strong opposition from member governments, regular monitoring was
not adopted as part of the Kimberley Process scheme.12 3 Thus, the United
States, despite its faith in the Kimberley Process, continues to import
conflict diamonds and unintentionally supports a system that has created
countless refugees and funded terrorist organizations.
Despite the failures of the Kimberley Process and continued doubt
over its efficacy, some experts remain idealistic about the Kimberley
Process and its ability to disrupt the pipeline of conflict diamonds. Dealers
115. See id at 36-42 (outlining the Certification Scheme and the responsibilities of
participating countries).
116. See generally GLOBAL WITNESS, KEY, supra note 91. The Global Witness Report
outlines seven case studies of countries that are attempting to comply with the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme. The report reveals serious weaknesses in the practices of
diamond producing countries, which, if not corrected, could seriously undermine the
entire scheme.
117. Id. at7.
118. Id. at 6.
119. "Diamonds from the DRC have never been subject to U.N. Security Council
Resolutions classifying them as 'Conflict Diamonds,' however the role ... of diamonds
in fuelling the devastating conflict in the DRC has been well-documented." Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 1l.
121. GLOBAL WITNESS, BROKEN VOWS, supra note 74, at 13.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id.
caught with conflict diamonds face sanctions under the Kimberley
Process, which include expulsion from trade associations and the end of
the dealer's ability to operate in the diamond industry. 124 Optimistic
proponents of the Kimberley Process hope the scheme will ease the
movement of "clean" diamonds, thereby making conflict diamonds more
expensive to export due to the risk and bribery involved. 125 Eventually,
it is reasoned, conflict diamonds will no longer be lucrative for those
willing to kill for them. 126
Despite this optimistic outlook, the Kimberley Process may be an
inherently flawed process that will not aid Congress in accomplishing
the goals set forth in the CDTA. As reasoned by Greg Campbell, "[t]he
documents required by the Kimberley Process and the Clean Diamond
Act will not stop the traffic."' 127 Diamonds are one of the most concentrated
forms of wealth and offer huge returns due to their price and the ease
with which they can be smuggled. 28 A certification scheme will not
deter diamond traffic so long as officials in diamond producing areas
continue to be amenable to bribery. 29 Moreover, with fortunes to be
had and a well-established system in place, 130 the trade in conflict
diamonds will not be deterred by certificates placed on packages.
VI. REVISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The current legislation designed to combat the trade in conflict
diamonds has proven ineffectual in curbing the human rights abuses and
terrorism associated with the diamond trade. It places too much confidence
on a system of international delegation that has little to no oversight over
its participating members. Therefore, the United States must take a more
proactive approach in dealing with this catastrophic problem. Rather
than trusting this issue to unaccountable countries and diamond industry
insiders, the United States must create legislation that can more effectively
combat the issue of conflict diamonds.
124. Feldman, supra note 78, at 866.
125. Id. at 867.
126. Id.
127. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 202.
128. GLOBAL WrrNESS, CONFLICr DIAMONDS, supra note 5, at 2; see also CAMPBELL,
supra note 6, at 37 ("diamonds are among the easiest-and by far the most valuable by
weight--commodities to smuggle. Three hundred grams of diamonds are equal in value
to 40,000 pounds of iron ore ... Millions of dollars worth of diamonds can be carried
almost anywhere in the body or on it .... ).
129. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 202.
130. See id.; see also Price, supra note 58, at 25 (stating that the trade in conflict
diamonds is estimated to be worth approximately $300 million a year, accounting for
three to fifteen percent of the global trade).
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Beyond the Clean Diamond Trade Act, the USA PATRIOT Act
13 1
also has the potential to slow the trade in conflict diamonds. President
Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, with the
intent of preventing terrorist acts within the United States.' 32  The
PATRIOT Act requires financial institutions to establish processes to
monitor all transactions and ensure they are legitimate, thereby creating
anti-money laundering programs.133 Thus, the USA PATRIOT Act could
effectively deter diamond insiders who want to trade with the United
States from dealing in conflict diamonds. 134 The PATRIOT Act places
the burden of compliance on dealers to transact only with vendors and
customers who are also in compliance.135
Although the PATRIOT Act remains untested as tool in combating the
trade in conflict diamonds, relying on this legislation is an ill-advised
solution. First, civil liberties groups have strongly criticized the PATRIOT
Act as undermining rights to free speech and free association by
allowing the government unprecedented capability to place surveillance
on its citizens.' 36 Second, because the PATRIOT ACT is focused on the
prevention of terrorism, it may not provide adequate attention to
diamonds coming from areas that are funding human rights abuses rather
than terrorism.
Rather than relying on legislation not specifically designed to combat
conflict diamonds, the United States should take a more concrete
approach to combating the conflict diamond cartel. By distancing itself
from the Kimberley Process and enacting legislation with greater
efficacy, the United States could put an end to conflict diamonds. The
United States must enact legislation that provides effective oversight
over the cartel and sanctions against countries that produce and trade in
131. The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for "Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism," Pub. L.
No. 107-56 (2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act].
132. Id.
133. Id. § 302(b)(1).
134. See Maggi, supra note 27, at 544.
135. Merle Almeida, India Seminar: Compliance, Compulsions and Consequences,
Rapaport@Diamonds.Net, Jan. 29 2004, http://www.diamonds.net/news/newsitem.asp?
num=9146&type=all&topic=all&searchfor=&author=almeida.
136. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Patriot Act Fears are Stifling
Free Speech, ACLU Says in Challenge to Law (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.
aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13255&c=207; see also Dan Eggen, Patriot
Act Faces New Challenge In Court: Group Says Law Limits Free Speech, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 2003, at A08; see also Eric Lichtblau, Citing Free Speech, Judge Voids Part of
Antiterror Act, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2004, at A16.
conflict diamonds. By drafting legislation similar to the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), the United States could effectively halt
the conflict diamond cartel by providing incentives not only for countries to
improve their internal controls but also by providing incentives for the
diamond industry to regulate itself more effectively.
The ILSA authorizes the President to penalize foreign companies,
foreign individuals and, under certain conditions, foreign nations that
invest in or trade with Iran or Libya, nations that the United States
purports to be developing weapons of mass destruction and to sponsor
terrorism. 137  The ILSA mandates the President impose two or more
sanctions, out of a list of six, on any entity that enters into certain types
of transactions with either nation.1 38 For example, sanctions can be imposed
on a "sanctioned person" who invests in or aids Libya's or Iran's
petroleum resources, aviation capabilities, or in either nation's ability to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. 1
39
The ILSA imposes the following sanctions: 1) the denial by the
Export-Import Bank to issue any guarantee, insurance, extension of
credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the
export of any goods or services to any sanctioned person; 2) refusal to
grant export licenses; 3) the prohibition on all U.S. financial institutions
from making loans or providing credit to any sanctioned person; 4) the
prohibition of financial institutions from being agents of the U.S.
government; 5) the refusal to enter into procurement contracts with
sanctioned parties; and 6) the restriction of imports from offending parties.140
Unlike other trade sanctions, the ILSA constitutes not only a boycott
against the offending nation but also a "secondary boycott."' 41 The ILSA
imposes sanctions on nations that fail to abide by the boycott as well as
corporations and other foreign persons that trade with Iran or Libya. 142
In short, the ILSA puts the entire trading community on notice, rather
than just one or two foreign governments.
Notably, the ILSA requires the President to impose sanctions for a period
of no less than two years. 43 However, if the President determines and certifies
137. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)) [hereinafter ILSA]; see also Meghan McCurdy,
Unilateral Sanctions with a Twist: The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 397, 398 (1997); Michael A. Asaro, Comment, The Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996: A Thorn in the Side of the World Trading System, 23 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 505, 506-09 (1997).
138. See ILSA, supra note 137, § 5(a)-(b).
139. See id. § 5(b)(1)(A)-(C).
140. Id. § 6(1)-(6).
141. Asaro, supra note 137, at 507-08.
142. Id.
143. ILSA, supra note 137, § 9(b)(1).
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to Congress that the sanctioned person is no longer engaging in prohibited
activities, then the President may remove the sanctions after one year.
144
In either case, sanctions against foreign corporations and/or nations found to
be in violation of the ILSA are mandatory rather than discretionary.
Like the ILSA, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD)
Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act) 145 imposed various sanctions against
foreign nationals and corporations that engaged in specific types of trade
with Cuba.146 The Helms-Burton Act's principal purpose is, "to deter
nationals of third countries from doing business with and investing in
Cuba,"'147 with the goal of encouraging Cuba to install a democratically
elected government. 148 The Helms-Burton Act authorizes Congress to
deny aid to any country that provides assistance to Cuba in numerous
forms, including debt forgiveness. 1
49
Applying these types of secondary boycotts to foreign nations and
corporations will provide the needed legislative bite to stop the trade
in conflict diamonds and thus curb human rights abuses and money
laundering by terrorist groups. A piece of legislation similar to the ILSA
or Helms-Burton Act should combine elements of both the CDTA and
the PATRIOT Act into a single law that targets both nations and
corporations not in compliance with the intent of the Kimberley Act.
Andreas Lowenfeld describes a secondary boycott as used in the ILSA
and Helms-Burton Act:
State A says that if X, a national of state C, trades with state B, X may not trade
with or invest in A. In other words, X is required to make a choice between
doing business with or in A, the boycotting state, and doing business with or in
B, the target state, although under the law of C where X is established, trade
with both A and C is permitted. 150
Applied to the trade in conflict diamonds, Congress could enact
legislation barring a foreign corporation or state that trades with a country
144. Id. § 9(b)(2).
145. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 6021-91 (2004) [hereinafter Libertad Act].
146. See generally id. §§ 6082-6091.
147. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act: Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419,
426 (1996).
148. Libertad Act, supra note 145, § 6022.
149. Id. §6032.
150. Lowenfeld, supra note 147, at n.56 (stating that a "tertiary boycott occurs if state A,
the boycotting state, blacklists not only X which traded with state B, but also Y, which
traded with X.").
that produces or trades in conflict diamonds from trading or investing in
the United States. Such a secondary boycott would provide a significant
incentive for corporations and foreign nations to impose internal controls
to ensure that diamonds flowing in and out of their countries have been
certified as conflict-free. Whereas the Kimberley Process leaves internal
controls to the states themselves with little to no oversight,' 5 ' this type of
legislation would impose penalties sure to result in increased monitoring
and oversight.
Using the ILSA and Helms-Burton Act as guidelines for new conflict
diamond legislation would counter the CDTA's permissiveness. Currently,
under the CDTA, sanctions include fines between $10,000 and $50,000
for individuals and corporations who violate the CDTA and possible
imprisonment for ten years.152 However, under the ILSA, countries and
corporations can lose the ability to trade with the United States on any
level. 153 The imposition of fines established by the CDTA would not
deter a nation or a company like DeBeers'54 that earns billions of dollars
selling to diamond merchants in the United States. However, a complete
denial of assistance and the loss of the ability to trade with the United
States would place appropriate pressure on entities dealing in conflict
diamonds. The United States is the world's largest diamond consumer,'55
and entities dealing in diamonds cannot afford to lose access to the U.S.
market for any period of time due to trade sanctions.
Similar to the ILSA, new legislation should place the responsibility for
implementation, including providing reports concerning foreign states'
compliance, on the Secretary of State. 156 The Department of State would
151. Kaplan, supra note 11, at 591.
152. CDTA, supra note 80, § 3907.
153. See ILSA, supra note 137, § 6(1)-(6).
154. DeBeers is the most dominant corporation in the international diamond trade.
DeBeers mines approximately 50% of the world diamond production and controls an
estimated 70% of the world's diamond sales, In 2000, DeBeers sold a record $5.7 billion
worth of diamonds and its profits surpassed $1.2 billion. See GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT
DIAMONDS, supra note 5, at 3-6; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 137.
155. GLOBAL WITNESS, CONFLICT DIAMONDS, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that "[i]n
1998, 33 million pieces of diamond jewelry were sold in the United States, with an
average price of $655 per item, worth $22 billion").
156. See Memorandum on Delegation of Responsibilities Under the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,249 (Nov. 21, 1996). The Memorandum states:
I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the functions vested in the President
by the following provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-72) ("the Act"), such functions to be exercised in consultation
with the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce and the United States
Trade Representative, and with the Export-Import Bank and Federal Reserve
Board and other interested agencies as appropriate: sections 4(c), 5(a), 5(b),
5(c), 5(f), 6(1), 6(2), and 9(c). I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the
functions vested in the President by the following provisions of the Act:
sections 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), 4(e), 5(d), 5(e), 9(a), 9(b), and 10.
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be responsible for securing the removal of assistance by foreign countries to
those dealing in conflict diamonds. 157 The legislation should authorize
the Secretary of State to deny export-import bank assistance or import
licenses, or to impose other sanctions on foreign corporations and nations
that do not comply with the legislation. 158 Notably, such legislation should
also authorize the Secretary of State to engage in multilateral negotiations
with international partners to encourage compliance and to impose
sanctions where appropriate. 159 Placing the responsibility for oversight
on Department of State is appropriate, since it is the governmental entity
most adept at studying and reacting to international conditions.
Legislation modeled after the ILSA or the Helms-Burton Act is likely
to be controversial. Both acts have been criticized as violating U.S.
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 160
and the World Trade Organization (WTO), due to their imposition of
trade restrictions for national security reasons. 16 1 The GATT sets forth major
principles of free trade such as: 1) trade based on non-discrimination;
2) the removal of government restraint on the movement of goods; and
3) discussion and agreement on terms and trade conditions among
parties. 162 Therefore, it could be argued that a law designed to limit
trade in order to curb human rights abuses and terrorism would violate
international trade regulations.
Despite this concern, the United States passed both the ILSA and the
Helms-Burton Act in order to promote national security and the spread
Id.
157. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001), § 6. The
Executive Order states:
[t]he Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and other appropriate
agencies shall make all relevant efforts to cooperate and coordinate with other
countries, including through technical assistance, as well as bilateral and
multilateral agreements and arrangements, to achieve the objectives of this
order, including the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, the denial
of financing and financial services to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and
the sharing of intelligence about funding activities in support of terrorism.
Id.
158. Cf ILSA, supra note 137, § 6 (describing various sanctions that can take place
under the ILSA).
159. Cf ILSA, supra note 137, § 4 (permitting multilateral negotiations to take place).
160. The GATT was established at the end of World War II in order to regulate
international economic relations and has been the "principal international multilateral
treaty for trade." See Asaro, supra note 137, at 512.
161. Asaro, supra note 137, at 510; see generally McCurdy, supra note 137.
162. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 l, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. XXII.
of democracy. The passage of the CDTA was met with similar trade
concerns, 163 but Congress was not deterred from enacting the legislation.
Therefore, the passage of such aggressive legislation would not be
without precedent.
Moreover, a newly formulated statute (although potentially unpopular
internationally) would actually protect the legitimate diamond industry
to a greater extent than a full-blown boycott on diamonds. Countries
with legitimate diamond industries like South Africa and Botswana have
a huge financial stake in the diamond trade and a boycott on the gems
would cause serious harm to their economies.' 64 A newly formulated
law would protect these economies by imposing sanctions solely on
those nations and corporations that deal in conflict diamonds and the
legitimate trade in diamonds would continue unabated.
VII. CONCLUSION
The river of diamonds illicitly flowing out of Africa has created
uninvited channels of smuggling, violence, displacement and bloodshed.
By damming this source of wealth, both at its source and in midstream,
nations can achieve security for themselves and peace for others.
Due to the nature of the conflict diamond trade, a multilateral
approach must be applied in order to restrain the movement of the gems
out of war zones. Compliance must be achieved by both foreign nations
and corporations in order for any real change to take place. As the
champion of democracy and the largest consumer of diamonds, the
United States must take the lead in combating the trade in illicit
diamonds.
By choking off this pipeline with effective legislation, the United
States will accomplish two objectives. First, the United States will halt
the funneling of money to terrorist organizations and thereby restrict
their mobility and activities. Second, the United States will remove a
major incentive for conflict in Africa, preventing waves of refugees and
bloodshed. Adopting the ILSA and Helms-Bums Act as models, the
United States will provide adequate incentives for all parties involved
with the trade not to deal in diamonds originating from conflict areas in
Africa. The threat of closing the American marketplace would provide
sufficient deterrence to create real change in the trade of African conflict
diamonds. Strong and uncompromising legislation from the United
States would halt both the current trade in conflict diamonds and prevent
channels from opening in the future.
163. See generally Feldman, supra note 78.
164. CAMPBELL, supra note 6, at 128.
